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This article explores the relationship between executive compensation and
employee voice using a panel dataset from Korean firms. It was found that
the existence and rate of labour unionization are both negatively associated
with executive compensation payment, and that the negative association is
progressively stronger for upper percentile executive pay. Labour union existence
also has a strong negative correlation with stock option use in executive
compensation packages, but unionization rate does not, implying that union
existence is more critical in shaping executive compensation structures than the
strength of the union.Membership of large family-owned business conglomerates
(chaebol), high financial risk and high employee wages are identified as channels
that reinforce the negative influence of labour unions on executive compensation.
1. Introduction
A number of corporations have revealed that during the financial crisis of
the late 2000s, they paid extremely high compensation packages to managers
whose business decisions caused severe pain to other stakeholders as a result
of plummeting share prices and increasing layoffs. Since then, discussion on
how executive pay is decided continues. Although research on managerial
compensation has been largely skewed to shareholder–manager relationships
based on agency theory, CEO pay is no longer a private matter between
principals and agents, as publicly disclosed information on executive pay
affects many aspects of corporations such as governance and culture (Jensen
and Murphy 1990). Other stakeholders such as labour unions, consumers,
government and themedia have access to this information, and therefore, have
the potential to affect executive compensation, either directly or indirectly. In
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particular, since the recent financial crisis, the role of employees has attracted
much attention in the debate on executive compensation. Based on concerns
about fairness, disparities between executives and employees are frequently
discussed, as chief executives take on large compensation packages, while their
employees endure wage concessions or are made redundant.
As suppliers of labour, employees provide the most critical input for a
firm and have potential to influence executive compensation in various ways.
First, employees can be active monitors of managerial misbehaviour (given
that their interest is closely linked to how their firm is managed). Second,
because demotivated workers who feel disadvantaged and unfairly treated
cause productivity concerns (Adams 1966; Hatfield and Sprecher 1984),
managers have an incentive to care about the upper and lower level employee
wage disparity.
In this study, I utilize the presence and rate of labour unionization (using
Korean data) as measures of employee voice and power within a firm
to explore theoretical predictions that employee voice influences executive
compensation. Korean data provide a unique opportunity to explore the
topic in a specific context, as Korean labour unions have maintained their
original roles as monitors of corporate management relatively well and as
strong opposition voices on corporate misbehaviour. Today, labour unions
in most developed countries have lost their sense of solidarity and influence.
In addition, while the level of economic development in Korea allows
comparison with findings from more frequently studied countries such as
the United States, Korea’s unique corporate governance characteristics (such
as the strong presence of large family-owned business conglomerates known
as chaebol) enable exploration of cross-sectional differences of influence for
labour unions on executive compensation in a different type of corporate
governance. An additional major difference is that, unlike most studies
that focus on CEO’s compensation only in the United States, I examine
compensation of all executives’ in Korean companies. Thus, I explore the
broader context of the pay gap between executive-level workers and employees
in contrast to those studies that focus on just one CEO at the top.
The data were analysed by running regressions with industry or firm
and year fixed effects using 11 years of panel data from 242 Korean firms,
controlling for business circumstances and corporate governance structure. I
found that the presence and rate of labour unionization were both negatively
associated with executive cash compensation: when an increasing number of
employees become organized, executives are likely to be paid less. In addition,
using unconditional quantile regression, I demonstrated that this negative
association is progressively stronger for the upper percentile executive pay.
This implies that labour unions play a role in compressing the range of
executive cash compensation, and in maintaining a higher level of equality
with regard to employee payments. I also found that a union presence is a
more critical determinant of reduced stock option use, while unionization rate
is not, which means as long as a firm has an organized union, adopting a
new method of compensating executives becomes more difficult. The negative
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effects are stronger in chaebol firms (which traditionally pay much higher
compensation to their directors), as well as in firms with high financial risk
and high employee wages, showing that labour unions function as monitors
of management misbehaviour and contribute to improved equality in pay in
the workplace. However, it was found that labour intensity did not play a
mitigating role regarding labour union influence over executive compensation,
although labour-intensive operation might imply strong labour voice. This
could be because today most Korean firms operate more in capital- or
technology-intensive industries and relative increase in labour intensity does
not reinforce labour union voice.
The rest of the article is presented as follows. Section 2 consists of a literature
review concerning the relationship between employee voice, labour union
and executive compensation and background knowledge of labour unions
in Korean firms. Section 3 describes the dataset and methodology. Section 4
presents the findings of this article. Section 5 concludes.
2. Literature review
Employees and Executive Compensation
Theoretical arguments predict that unions can potentially both increase
(Mahoney 1979; Simon 1957) and decrease CEO compensation (Jensen and
Murphy 1990). The former can happen because of the social norm that
there has to be a fair degree of difference between lower and upper level
employee pay (the ratchet effect). Conversely, employees pressure executives
by negotiating pay concessions through collective bargaining and public
exposure to debate on executive pay, aiming at a higher level of equity (the
braking or dampening effect).
A limited number of empirical studies have presented mixed results.
DiNardo et al. (1997) found that in the United States and Europe,
fewer managers are employed in unionized firms, concluding that unions
redistribute rents towards workers by reducing the number of managers
instead of the amounts of their pay. Using American data, Gomez and
Tzioumis (2006) found a negative effect for labour unions on executive
pay, which becomes progressively stronger for higher pay groups, while
performance sensitivity in relation to pay remained constant. Similarly,
Banning and Chiles (2007) showed that CEOs in union firms are paid less but
experience lower risk in terms of the composition of their pay as a trade-off.
Huang et al. (2017) show that labour unions in the United States curb CEO
compensation, especially prior to those union contract negotiations when
unions are in strong bargaining positions. However, Singh andAgarwal (2002)
identified the ratchet effect inCanadianmetal-mining firms, whereby executive
pay is significantly higher in unionized firms.
When observing workplaces, there are more reasons to predict a negative
relationship between strong employee power and executive compensation.
Employees as stakeholders are active monitors of managers, given their close
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interest in how managers operate their firm. If managerial misbehaviour
creates economic difficulties (such as increased layoffs and reduced workers’
wages), employees are the first to experience the effects. Therefore, less senior
employees often engage in invigilating executives with the support of employee
stock ownership (ESO) and union representation in annual meetings. Such
systemized and institutionalized employee voice enables them to request
corporate information and limit executive power (Bebchuk and Fried 2003).
Organized employees also aim to achieve higher levels of equity. Dornstein
(1991) found that less senior employees’ feelings of inequity lead them to
act through absenteeism, strikes, vandalism and violence (Martin 1982; Staw
1984) and made them less supportive of the goals of a better rewarded group,
which resulted in decreased productivity and efficiency (Hatfield and Sprecher
1984). Given that executives’ long-term compensation or job security depends
on firm performance, managers might forego excessive pay voluntarily to
remove the elements that obstruct productivity. DeAngelo and DeAngelo
(1991) and Huang et al. (2017) show supporting evidence that CEOs receive
lower compensation for their union-negotiation years to demonstrate their
sacrifice to employees.
To maintain recognition and bargaining rights, labour unions need to
mobilize members (Crouch 1982) through common interests (Traxler 1995)
such as executive pay. When employees have sufficient power (such as
through readily marketable skills), labour unions need to generate extra
demand for unionization that is more generalizable to all workers Marsden
(2013). Using topical issues such as executive pay helps labour unions with
their organizational imperative to create such demand, which means greater
pressure on management and shareholders to reduce pay.
Some anecdotal evidence supports the phenomena explained previously.
In Korea, Kook-Min bank’s CEO was criticized by the banks’ labour
union regarding his excessive stock option reward, which did not match his
performance contributions. In 2007, the labour union mobilized itself to vote
against the CEO serving consecutive terms and induced their bank to revise
its overall CEO remuneration system. Following these initiatives, other mega-
size banks (such as Shin-Han Bank and Hana Bank) also adjusted down their
CEO’s stock option rewards. Moreover, in the United States, when American
Airlines gave its CEOa 10 per cent salary increase in 2010 (while resistingwage
increases for its employees), the labour union planned to exert public pressure
throughmedia exposure and strikes. This was the labour union’s expression of
concern about fairness as well as sinceremonitoring of the company’s business
operation, as it was the only major US airline company to lose money at that
time (Koenig 2011). The labour union of the Motion Picture and Television
Fund reported similar complaints in 2013, stating that their CEO was being
paid excessively while employees were asked to make concessions (Ellingson
2013). Such anecdotes illustrate that organized employees actively monitor
their executives and express concerns for unfairness with regard to payments.
This might foster an organizational imperative in labour unions and increase
solidarity among members who share similar viewpoints.
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Various channels exist through which employees can affect top executive
pay. Employees can request an executive pay concession directly through
institutionalized voice and industrial action based on general preference
for equal pay and fairness (Gomez and Tzioumis 2006), especially when
workers are asked to bear such changes (Singh and Agarwal 2002). Indirectly,
organized employees can influence executive compensation through their
negative influence on a firm’s profitability (Banning and Chiles 2007) and
financial market performance (Gomez and Tzioumis 2006). Abowd and
Farber (1990), Becker and Olson (1989) and Bronars and Deere (1994) show
that collective bargaining by employees can have a negative impact on stock
prices and can eventually reduce the value of executives’ stock options.
Executives may also voluntarily decide to withhold excessive pay due to
employee pressure based on an implicit regulation hypothesis (Jensen and
Murphy 1990). Employees perceive high executive pay as an indicator of the
firms’ financial health, and thus, demand wage increases for employees. To
avoid coping with such negotiation attempts, executives could choose to have
less in the first place (Gregg and Machin 1988; Huang et al. 2017; Singh and
Agarwal 2002).
Employee Voice and Labour Union
In this study, I measured employee voice and bargaining power by the
labour union presence and unionization rate, which are proven in previous
empirical studies (Klasa et al. 2009) to be useful proxies. In this section,
I provide the theoretical link between labour unionization and employee
power.
Employees can do one of two actions when they are not satisfied with
their firm: leave their job or voice concern as an attempt to fix the problem
(Freeman and Medoff 1984; Hirschman 1970). Leaving is only possible when
jobs are available outside their firm. Voice can be classified as either individual
or collective, and individual voice is available only when employees have job
opportunities elsewhere (Freeman and Medoff 1984). This is because the
identity of the individual is easily exposed by them voicing concerns, and
management might find it more efficient to remove or penalize the individual
rather than making changes to the workplace. Therefore, a collective voice
such as a labour union is likely to be the main locus of available action for
the majority of employees (Dundon et al. 2004; Marchington and Wilkinson
2005).
However, the iron law of oligarchy that bureaucratic and corrupt power
arises in any kind of organization is often levelled against labour union leaders.
When union leaders stay closer to management and seek self-interests (such
as taking bribes from firms to exercise their authority against members’
interests), union activities may not be an effective threat to management
(Hyman 1975). Also, as the nature of work has diversified frommanufacturing
to services and from full-time to part-time, it became harder for unions to
negotiate various workers’ interests collectively. Disney et al. (1996) showed
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that in the United Kingdom, a shift away from traditional workplaces with
homogenous worker interests (such as in the mining industry) resulted in a
dramatic decrease in labour union powers.
In Korea where labour unions have a relatively short history of legal
recognition and are still actively involved inmanifestingworkplace discontent,
conflict between union leaders and members rarely arises as a serious issue.
With regard to diverging interests among employees, whether the union is
already formally organized should showwhether employees have amechanism
for their voice to be heard. If unions are already organized (overcoming
the initial costs of structuring a group and building capacity for collective
action), this implies that they have great potential to pose a credible threat
to management (Kelly 1998). In addition, in countries such as Korea where
there are no other representative forms of organizations for employees (such
as works councils in Germany), labour unions provide a sole collective voice
and this helps unions to maintain their power.
One of the issues on which organized employees have recently raised their
voice is executive compensation. For example, in the United Kingdom, the
Trades Union Congress (TUC) challenged executive pay, pointing out that
executives continued to receive austerity-busting paywhen employees’ families
were struggling to cope with the biggest squeeze on their incomes. The TUC
asked government to allow workers to sit on companies’ pay committees to
limit the executive pay (Neville 2013). In the United States, the American
Federation of Labour and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO)
created a web page to provide extensive statistical and graphical information
on the gap between executive pay and employee wages (AFL-CIO 2013).
In Switzerland, labour unions have criticized executive salaries, pointing out
the large discrepancies between executive and employee pay. In Korea where
company-level unions are more active than confederations, the issue was
raised frequently by company-level unions (Choi 2013; Hong 2010). Given
the theoretical and anecdotal evidence, here I adopt labour union as a proxy
for employee power.
Labour Union and Executive Compensation in Korea
Corporate governance in Korea is different from that in Anglo-Saxon
countries. In more than 80 per cent of large firms, the controlling shareholders
are among the top executives (Claessens et al. 2000) due to the tradition
of owner-manager status and due to the Korean Government’s financial
and regulatory protection towards owners of core industry conglomerates in
the 1960s and 1970s. Together with a lack of powerful monitoring, minor
shareholders are often overlooked (Jang and Kim 2002) and a substantial
gap emerges between cash-flow rights and control rights. As a result, owner-
managers retain substantial power and hired CEO’s decision-making rights
are limited.
While the protection ofminor shareholders is relatively weak, labour unions
draw high levels of attention. Despite having a short history since 1987,
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Korea labour unions have become strong and active and this is explained by
government policies, economic environment and social changes during that
time. Korean unionism started as a social movement that followed the French
style, but over time, it developed more in line with Japanese-style unionism,
where company-level unions have the most negotiating power. During Korean
industrial development in the 1960–1987, the government restricted labour
union activities with extremely repressive labour laws and pro-capital policies
that assisted the establishment of large chaebol groups (Kwon and O’Donnell
1999). Consequently, wages and working environment were set by employers,
not by negotiation, and there was widespread exploitation of employees’
labour. From 1988, when given the freedom to organize labour unions,
workers could finally raise their voice about working conditions. If a company-
level union decided to be incorporated into industry unions, it was no longer
recognized as an autonomous union and lost its right to settle negotiations
within individual firms. Therefore, company unions became more popular. In
the first year of organization, unions secured 15–20 per cent wage increases,
along with various improvements in company welfare provisions (Koo 2000).
Since then, Korean labour unions have continued to be strong and systemized
such that just a decade after their introduction, they were able to lead a
massive nationwide strike in 1997 in protest against new labour laws. The
strike mobilized three million workers and shut down production in major
industries including automobile and ship building, and disrupted services in
hospitals, subway operations and television news broadcasting for three weeks
(Koo 2000).
Labour unions temporarily lost power during the Asian Financial Crisis
of 1998. Required by the IMF as a condition to receive bailout finance, the
government had to implement neoclassical economics-type labour regulations
and allow companies to lay off a large number of employees. As a result,
40,000 union members were fired between 1999 and 2001. However, as Korea
overcame the crisis, the unionization rate recovered to its earlier level until
the rate declined again from the mid-2000s. An increase of temporary and
part-time workers (not eligible to sign up as union members), increased
in the work environment, and industrial changes from manufacturing to
service- and knowledge-based sectors are possible reasons (Seoul Economy
2011). Although their activity reduced, reflecting the experience of being
oppressed and exploited by managers in the period of pro-capital policies,
Korean labour remains relatively strong compared to Western countries and
they often react aggressively concerning perceived issues of fairness (Jin
2013).
In this study, I expect there to be a negative relationship between employee
power and executive compensation given the activeness of labour unions
and high level of equity concerns in Korean firms. I also expect a negative
correlation between labour unions and stock option use based on frequent
media coverage of the labour unions’ resistance to the idea of introducing
stock options in firms. A stock option is a relatively new way of paying
executives in Korea, and was officially introduced in 1997; however, its use
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is not very widespread as only 29.3 per cent of the largest 200 firms were using
executive stock options by 2008. When firms consider adopting executive
stock option, labour unions tend to resist the idea, arguing that it only
increases the total compensation of executives while its usefulness as an
incentive is ambiguous at best.
I also expect that labour union influencewill interact with the characteristics
of a firm. The most notable characteristic within the Korean business
scene is the strong presence of chaebol groups, which traditionally exploited
employees through military-style human resource management (Kwon and
O’Donnell 1999). Furthermore, chaebol is a type of corporate governance
prone to promoting the entrenchment of directors and executives through
their close shareholder–management relationship. Frequent debates and
scandals regarding excessive executive pay among chaebol firms highlight
these problems. Given that labour unions are expected to monitor corporate
misbehaviour, I expect that labour union presence would mitigate chaebol
firm’s excessive executive pay. Other characteristics that could be explored are
financial risks that affect firms’ financial health (Banning and Chiles 2007),
employees’ wages indicating the degree of equal pay (Singh and Agarwal
2002) and labour intensity of a firm’s operation that indicates the strength
of employee voice in a firm.
3. Empirical design
Data Sources
I constructed an unbalanced panel dataset of Korea Composite Stock Price
Index (KOSPI) 200 index firms for the period of 1998–2008. Firms that had
been included in the KOSPI 200 index in any year during the period were used
except for financial industry firms. Because the Asian financial crisis period
was only likely to introduce downward bias (due to the weakened labour union
at that time), I did not exclude the period. The resulting dataset contained
1,328 observations from 242 firms.
Executive compensation and union status were collected manually from
each company’s annual report filed with the Financial Supervisory Service of
Korea. The reports disclose the total amount of cash compensation paid to
all executive directors, and I constructed figures for the average compensation
per executive director. Regarding stock options, whether they were included
in executive pay was also recorded. Annual reports provided data on the
existence of firm-level labour unions, numbers of unionmembers and the total
number of employees. The number of shares owned by board members, the
number of board members and independent directors were also hand-collated
from annual reports as control variables. I collected the following additional
control variables from the Korean database, KisValue: total assets, employee
wages, Tobin’s Q, stock returns, return on assets (ROA), stock return volatility
and ownership concentration.
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Construction of Variables
The outcome variables were executive directors’ average cash compensation
or stock option use. Average cash compensation (total executive director’s
compensation divided by the number of executive directors) is the only known
form of executive compensation in Korea, and a similar structure of variable
is used in studies for countries where individual compensation data are not
available; for example, Kubo (2003) for Japan, Kato and Long (2006) for
China and Kato et al. (2007) for Korea. With regard to stock options,
following Kato et al. (2007), I coded a binary variable for whether the firms
used the option payment method.
The explanatory variables were firm-level labour union presence and
unionization rate. Union presence was recorded as a binary variable and
unionization rate was the percentage of union members among total number
of employees.
Economic control variables were the total assets as a proxy for firm size,
Tobin’s Q as a proxy for market-based performance, stock return as a proxy
for stock market performance, ROA as a proxy for accounting performance
and stock return volatility as a proxy for firm risk. Corporate governance
controls were an average of employee wages, board ownership, ownership
structure and board size. All continuous variables were winsorized at the
top and bottom 1 per cent to remove extreme outliers. Table 1 presents the
definitions and summary statistics of the variables, and Table 2 provides
the correlation matrix.
Empirical Design
To test the link between labour union presence or strength and executives’ cash
compensation, I ran the following regressions with variations in models and
samples:
yit = α + β ·Unionit + γ · Zit + sit (1)
yit = α + β ·Uni Rateit + γ · Zit + sit (2)
where yit is the log-transformed average executive cash compensation in firm
i in year t,Unionit is a dummy variable for labour union presence,UniRateit is
the unionization rate and Zit is a vector for controlling variables. First, I ran
an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with year and industry fixed effects
and by clustering standard errors by firm. Then, I used union presence and
unionization rate (lagged by one year) to avoid a potential reverse causality
issue and to account for the possible time difference in changes in unionization
and executive compensation. Endogeneity issue that less talented managers
are forced to choose unionised firms and are paid lower compensation,
however it is less of an issue in Korean firms. As most executives are long-
term employees who are either members of the owner family or someone who
C© 2020 The Authors. British Journal of Industrial Relations published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
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TABLE 1
Unionization Rate by Industry and Year




Total cash compensation to executive directors divided by the number
of executive directors
Stock option use A binary variable equal to 1 if stock option is used in executive
compensation, 0 otherwise
Union presence A binary variable equal to 1 if the firm is unionized, 0 otherwise
Union rate Ratio of union member to total employees, 0 if a firm is not unionized
Tobin’s Q Ratio of the firm’s market value (sum of market value of equity and
book value of debt) to its book value
Stock return End of the year stock price divided by beginning of the year stock price
minus one
ROA Net income over total assets
Volatility Standard deviation of daily stock returns in a year multiplied by a
square-root of the number of trading days
Board ownership Percentage of shares held by board members among total number of
shares outstanding
Ownership structure Sum of three largest shareholders’ ownership
Board size Total number of all board members
Panel B: Summary statistics
Mean SD Min Max
Total Assets (KRW, bn) 2,481.11 6,615.18 10.88 72,519.22
Average Executive Compensation
(KRW, mm)
328.65 594.72 3.99 13,300
Stock Option Use 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00
Union Presence 0.74 0.44 0.00 1.00
Unionization Rate: All Firms (%) 33.53 28.95 0.00 86.63
Unionization Rate: Unionized Firms (%) 45.52 24.33 0.06 86.63
Average Employee Wage (KRW, mm) 38.43 13.10 8.24 96.14
Tobin’s Q 1.07 0.53 0.21 5.07
Stock Return 0.25 1.11 −0.97 19.00
ROA 0.02 0.21 −4.85 1.09
Volatility 53.97 20.37 0.00 244.99
Board Ownership (%) 10.75 12.62 0.00 55.41
Ownership Concentration (%) 39.88 15.84 6.52 99.05
Board Size 8.14 2.75 2.00 23.00
Observations 1,745
Note: The sample consists of a balanced panel of 242 Korean public firms for the period 1998–
2008.
climbed up the career ladders inside the firm, it is unlikely that they self-select
themselves into union or non-union firms at the executive level.
An important issue in this model is the possibility that unionization and
the level of executive compensation were simultaneously influenced by a third
factor; for example, if executive pay is lower in firms with poor performance
giving a rise to employee discontent and unionization at the same time, the
coefficients in the model would be misleading. Other examples would be
economic distress or management dedication. To minimize the possibilities,
I controlled for possible third factors. Firm size, Tobin’s Q, ROA and stock
C© 2020 The Authors. British Journal of Industrial Relations published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
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return volatility were controlled to reflect economic and business conditions.
High ownership concentration implies strongmonitoring by shareholders and
high board ownership implies that executives have a large stake in the firm, and
therefore, both controlled for executives’ improved commitment to the firm.
For unionization rate, I ran an additional model using firm fixed effects
to address the concern that unionization can be endogenous to omitted time-
invariant firm characteristics. For equation (2), I ran regressions using all firms
as well as using only unionized firms. Because the unionization rate for non-
unionized firmswas coded as 0 in all samplesmodels, separating the unionized
firms from all sample enabled testing the pure effect of increasing unionization
rate after excluding the effect coming from the conversion from non-unionized
to unionized firms. This model was not applicable for the union presence
variable, due to minimal changes in a firm’s union presence over time.
I repeated the analyses for stock option use. Because the stock option use
was coded as a binary variable, I estimated the following linear probability
model:
Stockit = α + β ·Unionit + γ · Zit + sit (3)
where Stockit is a dummy variable. The analysis was repeated with
unionization rate in place of union presence.
To explore cross-sectional differences between labour union’s influence
and executive compensation, I considered the following four aspects of
firm characteristics: chaebol group membership, firms’ level of financial
risk, employee wages and the level of labour intensity. To test whether
these characteristics mitigated the effect of labour unions on executive com-
pensation, I included an interaction termbetween characteristics variables and
the labour union variable as demonstrated in the following model:
yit = α + β1 ·Unionit · Xit + β2 ·Unionit + β3 · Xit + γ · Zit + sit (4)
Xit is one of the following characteristics variables: chaebol group
membership that is equal to 1 if a firm belongs to a chaebol group; financial
risk that is equal to 1 if a firm’s cash-flow volatility measured by quarterly
cash flows is above median in a given year; employee wage that is equal to 1
if a firm paid their employees above the industry median in a given year; and
level of labour intensity that is equal to 1 if a firm’s net sales over total number
of employees is below the industry median.
4. Results
Cash Compensation
(a) Labour union presence, unionization rate and executive compensation
For all results, the tables with coefficients for control variables are presented in
the Appendix and only shortened versions are reported due to limited space.
C© 2020 The Authors. British Journal of Industrial Relations published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
Unionized Employees’ Influence on Executive Compensation 13
TABLE 3
Labour Union Presence and Cash Compensation
Ln (Executive Compensation)
(1) (2)
Union Presence (1 if exist) −0.344***
(0.087)





Controls, Year & Industry FE Y Y
Adjusted R2 0.614 0.607
Note: This table presents the regression results of executive compensation on union presence.
Dependent variable is log-transformed average executive cash compensation. Independent
variable of interest is union presence that is equal to 1 if the firm is unionized. Column (1) is
using current year’s union presence, while column (2) is using previous year’s union presence.




The first analysis from equation (1) shows that executives in unionized
firms are paid significantly less than those in non-unionized firms. In Table 3,
column (1), the presence of unions correlates with 34.4 per cent lower cash
compensation for executives, and is statistically significant at a 1 per cent
level after including controls and industry and year fixed effects. Further, the
result is robust when the previous year’s union status is used (column (2)).
Although the magnitude of reduction appears large, given that the level of
executive compensation in Korea is significantly lower than in other countries,
the absolute value of reduction is, in fact, more realistic. To illustrate, the
average executive compensation is 328 million KRW (approximately 328,000
USD) in the sample, and the result implies that executives in unionized firms
will be paid 215millionKRW instead. Because very few rigorous changes were
found in firm-level union status over time, firm fixed-effect model was not used
for models with union presence.
According to Table A1, which reports coefficients for control variables,
employee wage was found to be strongly linked to executive compensation,
showing that executives’ compensation and employees’ pay move together,
sharing the risks or benefits in firms. This is similar to findings presented by
Kubo (2003) in Japan, who argued that the strong link between employee
and executive pay stems from the emotional tie between employees and
executives. Such solidarity is found in Korean firms as well, and it strengthens
the hypothesis that Korean executives would be responsive to employees’
complaints about pay differentials.
I investigated the relationship through the unionization rate, which is the
percentage of employees registered as union members as a proxy for unions’
C© 2020 The Authors. British Journal of Industrial Relations published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
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TABLE 4
Labour Union Rate and Cash Compensation
Panel A: All firms
Ln (Executive Compensation)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Union Rate: All Firms (%) −0.006*** −0.003**
(0.001) (0.001)
Union Rate at (t−1): All Firms (%) −0.006*** −0.003*
(0.001) (0.002)
Constant −0.461 4.875*** −1.707 4.643***
(1.647) (1.590) (1.845) (1.787)
Observations 1,310 1,310 1,103 1,103
Adjusted R2 0.617 0.866 0.607 0.887
Panel B: Unionized firms
Ln (Executive Compensation)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Union Rate: Unionized Firms (%) −0.004** −0.003*
(0.002) (0.002)
Union Rate at (t−1): Unionized Firms (%) −0.003* −0.003*
(0.002) (0.002)
Constant 1.746 6.584*** 0.316 4.156*
(1.803) (2.082) (2.041) (2.210)
Observations 1,000 1,000 847 847
Adjusted R2 0.572 0.836 0.557 0.860
Controls & Year FE Y Y Y Y
Industry FE Y N Y N
Company FE N Y N Y
Note: Panel A presents the regression results of executive compensation on unionization
rate. Dependent variable is log-transformed average executive cash compensation. Independent
variable of interest is unionization rate that is proportion of unionized employees. Columns (1)
and (2) are using current year’s unionization rate, while columns (3) and (4) are using previous
year’s unionization rate. Panel B replicates the analysis in Panel A using unionized firm sample




power to mobilize employees. The results from both OLS and firm fixed-
effect regressions showed that as unions get stronger, executives receive lower
compensation. In this analysis, the results of firm fixed-effects regressions were
also meaningful, because although not radical, the union rate in firms changes
every year. Table 4, PanelA, presents all samples inwhich the unionization rate
was coded as 0 per cent for non-unionized firms. In column (2), where all time-
invariant-omitted variables are controlled by firm fixed effect, I found that a
10 per cent increase in the union rate is associated with a 3 per cent decrease in
executive cash compensation (p < 0.05) and these results are consistent across
models.
C© 2020 The Authors. British Journal of Industrial Relations published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
Unionized Employees’ Influence on Executive Compensation 15
In Table 4, Panel B, the analysis is repeated using only unionized firms
to exclude the effect coming from the difference between non-union and
union firms. I found that the change in the level of union power matters, and
the results in Panel A are not driven solely by the difference between non-
union and union firms. In the firm fixed-effect model (column (2)), a 10 per
cent increase in the unionization rate is associated with 3 per cent decrease
in executive cash compensation (p < 0.10). The overall results confirm the
theoretical prediction.
(b) Executive compensation level and labour union: quantile regression
In this section, I investigated whether there was heterogeneity in union
influence at different levels of executive pay through quantile regressions.
Following the recent trend in econometrics, I used unconditional quantile
regression based on the re-centred influence function (RIF). According to
Firpo et al. (2009), this improves the previous method for measuring the
coefficients of unconditional means and addresses the concern that the results
are interpretable only within the sample in use. In Table 5, Panel A, I
found that executives who are paid higher compensation are more likely
to be affected by labour union presence compared to those with lower
compensation. An executive in a unionized firm who is paid at the 95th
percentile of the conditional distribution is likely to be paid 96.2 per cent
less compared to his counterpart in a non-unionized firm (p < 0.01), while
an executive who is paid at the 25th percentile will receive 11.9 per cent lower
compensation (p < 0.10). At the 5 per cent percentile, there is no statistically
significant difference. Using union rate in Panel B, I found that executive
compensation at the 95th percentile is lower by 8.81 per cent when union rate
goes up by 10 per cent (p < 0.01), while it is 3.94 per cent lower at the 25th
percentile (p < 0.01), showing similar patterns to union presence.
These findings provide evidence that unions compress executive comp-
ensation range. Together with the findings of Card (1996) who showed that
labour unions have stronger positive effect on lower quantile employee wage,
it particularly shows that unions achieve higher level of overall pay equity at
work (the quantile regression of employee wage in Korea is consistent to the
findings of Card (1996) and the table is presented in Table A6). One possible
reason is that organized employees are less tolerant of high-income disparity
and act vigorously against it. Another reason (following from the first) is that
executives in unionized firms understand the implicit regulation (Jensen and
Murphy 1990) and voluntarily withdraw from being paid excessively.
Stock Option
Although the amount of stock option paid to executives is not available,
whether firms use stock option in compensation package allows an analysis of
stock option use likelihood in firms. The linear probability model in Table 6
shows that executives in unionized firms are less likely to be paid with stock
options. In Table 7, Panel A, using all sample’s unionization rate, I found that
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TABLE 5
Quantile Regression: Level of Executive Compensation
Panel A: Union presence
Ln (Executive Compensation)
Q(0.05) Q(0.25) Q(0.5) Q(0.75) Q(0.95)
Union Presence (1 if exist) −0.0582 −0.119* −0.164** −0.527*** −0.962***
(−0.97) (−2.13) (−2.75) (−6.70) (−5.58)
Constant 9.365*** 2.194 −0.440 −4.774** 3.603
(4.77) (1.33) (−0.29) (−2.76) (1.09)
Observations 1,321 1,321 1,321 1,321 1,321
Adjusted R2 0.145 0.308 0.375 0.397 0.181
Panel B: Union rate
Ln (Executive Compensation)
Q(0.05) Q(0.25) Q(0.5) Q(0.75) Q(0.95)
Union Rate (%) 0.0000508 −0.00394*** −0.00398*** −0.00809*** −0.00881***
(0.05) (−4.30) (−4.35) (−6.63) (−3.50)
Constant 8.916*** 2.168 −1.904 −6.915*** 1.256
(4.31) (1.34) (−1.24) (−3.90) (0.36)
Observations 1,310 1,310 1,310 1,310 1,310
Adjusted R2 0.145 0.319 0.383 0.397 0.160
Controls, Year &
Industry FE
Y Y Y Y Y
Note: This table presents unconditional quantile regression results of union presence or union
rate on executive compensation. Dependent variable is log-transformed average executive cash
compensation and independent variable of interest is a binary variable that indicates union
presence in Panel A and unionization rate in Panel B. Each column measures the effect of union
on executive compensation in the corresponding quantile group. For example, column Q(0.05)
presents the effect of union presence on executive compensation that is in the lowest 5 percentile.




the probability of stock option use decreases with unionization rate increase;
however, the results are significant only in OLS models and not in firm fixed-
effects models. Moreover, when the sample was limited to unionized firms in
Panel B, no significant difference was found. This implies that union presence
is a more critical determinant for the adoption of new methods of payment
for executives, rather than the size of unions. This shows that as long as
unions can be organized, investing the initial costs of gathering employees
and establishing a structure, they can pose a credible threat to management
even with a lower rate of membership.
Cross-Sectional Variation in the Union’s Influence
In this section, I explore four potential firm characteristics that may
mitigate labour union influence on executive compensation: chaebol group
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TABLE 6
Union Presence and Stock Option Use
Stock option use
(1) (2)
Union Presence (1 if exist) −0.291***
(0.068)





Controls, Year & Industry FE Y Y
Adjusted R2 0.197 0.217
Note: This table presents the regression results of stock option use in executive compensation on
union presence. Dependent variable is a binary variable that is equal to 1 if the firm uses stock
option to pay executives, and 0 otherwise. Independent variable of interest is union presence that
is equal to 1 if the firm is unionized. Column (1) is using current year’s union presence, while
column





membership, level of financial risk, employee wages and the level of labour
intensity. By including the interaction terms between these variables and
labour union variables, I separated the effects that were attributed to these
channels from the total effect of labour unions.
In Table 8, which presents the results of cross-sectional analyses, OLS
regression is used for union presence models and firm fixed-effect regressions
for unionization rate models. Panel A shows that a union’s negative
influence over executive compensation is amplified in chaebol firms. Chaebol
membership of a firm is associated with 40 per cent higher executive
compensation; however, if labour unions exist, executive compensation is
lower by 36.8 per cent, almost cancelling the chaebol effect (column (1),
p < 0.05). Moreover, a 10 per cent increase in unionization rate is associated
with an 11 per cent decrease in cash compensation (column (2), p < 0.01).
Regarding stock options, the mitigating effect of chaebol membership is
weaker, but is consistently negative (columns (3) and (4)). Chaebol firms are
known to be vulnerable to management–shareholder entrenchment which
results in excessive executive pay, but the findings imply that labour unions
mitigate such problems.
Panel B shows that firms’ financial risk measured by above median industry
cash-flow volatility also works as a channel to reduce executive compensation,
although not as robustly as chaebol membership. Firms’ financial risk itself
is not a significant influencing factor for executive compensation; however,
when combined with an organized labour union, firms with a weak financial
position tend to pay their executives less by 32.9 per cent.
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TABLE 7
Union Rate and Stock Option Use
Panel A: All firms
Stock option use
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Union Rate: All Firms (%) −0.004*** −0.000
(0.001) (0.002)
Union Rate at (t−1): All Firms (%) −0.004*** 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Constant −2.423 −1.070 −2.652 −1.653
(1.497) (1.775) (1.692) (1.770)
Observations 1,310 1,310 1,103 1,103
Adjusted R2 0.174 0.879 0.186 0.923
Panel B: Unionized firms
Stock option use
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Union Rate: Unionized Firms (%) −0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.003)
Union Rate at (t−1): Unionized Firms (%) −0.001 0.003**
(0.001) (0.001)
Constant −0.613 −2.954 −0.886 −2.219
(1.602) (2.275) (1.694) (2.534)
Observations 1,000 1,000 847 847
Adjusted R2 0.167 0.863 0.175 0.909
Controls & Year FE Y Y Y Y
Industry FE Y N Y N
Company FE N Y N Y
Note: Panel A presents the regression results of stock option use in executive compensation on
unionization rate. Dependent variable is a binary variable that is equal to 1 if the firm uses stock
option to pay executives, and 0 otherwise. Independent variable of interest is unionization rate that
is proportion of unionized employees. Columns (1) and (2) are using current year’s unionization
rate, while columns (2) and (4) are using previous year’s unionization rate. Panel B replicates





Panel C shows that firms with above industry median employee wages tend
to pay lower executive cash compensation when they have an organized union.
High employee wage is associated with high executive compensation, proving
a ratchet effect. However, when labour union co-presents with high employee
wages, executives are paid 28.1 per cent less, improving overall fairness at
work. The interaction effect is not significant for unionization rate or stock
option use.
I explored whether a firm’s level of labour intensity matters for labour
union’s voice over executive compensation. When a firm operates with a
labour-intensive business model, workers naturally have higher voices for
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TABLE 8
Mitigating Effects of Chaebol Membership, Financial Risk, Employee Wage and Labour
Intensity
Panel A: Chaebol membership
Ln(Executive
Compensation) Stock option use
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Union Presence × Chaebol −0.368** −0.246*
(0.160) (0.132)
Union Rate × Chaebol −0.011*** −0.005*
(0.004) (0.003)
Union Rate 0.002 0.002
(0.003) (0.002)




Constant 1.128 5.371* −1.479 −1.144
(1.750) (3.036) (1.483) (1.657)
Observations 1,282 1,271 1,282 1,271
Adjusted R2 0.631 0.868 0.211 0.880
Panel B: Financial risk
Ln(Executive
Compensation) Stock option use
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Union Presence × Financial Risk −0.329** −0.029
(0.152) (0.121)
Union Rate × Financial Risk −0.003 −0.001**
(0.002) (0.001)
Union Presence (1 if exist) −0.178* −0.274***
(0.098) (0.086)
Union Rate −0.002 0.001
(0.003) (0.002)
Financial Risk 0.087 0.054 −0.029 0.049*
(0.138) (0.071) (0.113) (0.026)
Constant 0.109 6.482* −2.605 −2.204
(1.882) (3.328) (1.624) (1.871)
Observations 1,203 1,192 1,203 1,192
Adjusted R2 0.615 0.867 0.183 0.879
(Continued)
important issues. However, as shown in Panel D, using the labour intensity
measure that is net sales over total number of employees, I did not find that
firmswith above industrymedian labour intensity reacted differently to labour
union’s presence or rate. This is because during the sample period, most
Korean firms operated in high-technology industries and labour intensity was
no longer a determining factor of how strong labour union should be in a
firm.
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TABLE 8
Continued
Panel C: High employee wage
Ln(Executive
Compensation) Stock option use
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Union Presence × High Employee Wage −0.281** −0.114
(0.119) (0.102)
Union Rate × High Employee Wage 0.002 −0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Union Presence (1 if exist) −0.195** −0.229**
(0.088) (0.089)
Union Rate −0.004 −0.000
(0.003) (0.002)
High Employee Wage 0.393*** −0.047 0.116 −0.005
(0.109) (0.063) (0.098) (0.030)
Constant 4.492** 4.731 −1.032 −1.219
(1.829) (3.183) (1.518) (1.900)
Observations 1,321 1,310 1,321 1,310
Adjusted R2 0.622 0.867 0.199 0.879
Panel D: Labour intensity
Ln(Executive
Compensation) Stock option use
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Union Presence × Labour Intensity −0.094 −0.068
(0.071) (0.056)
Union Rate × Labour Intensity −0.002 −0.002*
(0.001) (0.001)
Union Presence (1 if exist) −0.311*** −0.280***
(0.088) (0.073)
Union Rate −0.005*** −0.003**
(0.001) (0.001)
Labour Intensity −0.000 −0.000 −0.000** −0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant −0.177 −1.133 −2.716* −3.734**
(1.806) (1.744) (1.510) (1.502)
Observations 1,321 1,310 1,321 1,310
Adjusted R2 0.615 0.618 0.212 0.193
Controls & Year FE Y Y Y
Industry FE Y N Y N
Company FE N Y N Y
Note: This table presents the mitigating effects of four aspects of firms over union’s influence
on executive compensation. They are Chaebol membership, financial risk, employee wage and
labour intensity. Dependent variable is either log-transformed average executive compensation or
a binary indicator whether the firm uses stock option. Independent variable of interest is union
variables (union presence or unionization rate) interacted with Chaebol membership, financial
risk, employee wage or labour intensity. Chaebol membership is equal to 1 if a firm belongs to a
Chaebol group. Financial risk is equal to 1 if a firm’s cash-flow volatility is abovemedian in a given
year. High employee wage are equal to 1 if a firm’s employee wage is above industry median in a
given year. Labour intensity is equal to 1 if a firm has belowmedian production per labour, which
is calculated as net sales divided by total number of employees. Standard errors are clustered by
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Discussion
I found that the labour union’s presence was negatively associated with both
the amount of executive cash compensation and the likelihood that executives
would be paid with stock options. Union effect was progressively stronger for
executives with upper tail cash compensations and such negative association
strengthens with the labour union rate in case of cash compensation, but not in
stock option use. In cross-sectional analyses, a firm’s membership in chaebol
groups, financial risk and high employee wages are identified as factors that
reinforce labour union’s negative influence over executive compensation.
First, these findings provide empirical evidence for numerous discussions
that presume the labour unions’ role in reducing executive compensation,
allowing us to conclude that the theoretically presented channels such
as labour unions’ direct request or executives’ voluntary withdrawal from
excessive pay in unionized firms are working effectively in reality. As possible
mechanisms, the results show that labour unions’ influence is stronger in
chaebol-linked firms, when firms are with high financial risk, and when
employees are paid highly.
Second, the heterogeneous effect at upper and lower percentile executive
cash compensation implies that unions accept the pay differential between
executives and employees and focus on acting against what they consider to
be excessive pay, in line with Jensen and Murphy (1990)’s argument. This
also supports the implicit regulation hypothesis that executives avoid excessive
pay in unionized firms due to the concerns about productivity and efficiency
issues that arise among unhappy employees, in line with Gomez and Tzioumis
(2006)’s findings.
Third, the results show lower pay-performance sensitivities in Korean
unionized firms from two aspects. One is that labour unions truncate the
upper tail of executive compensation, therefore not allowing a strong linkage
between performance and pay as Jensen and Murphy (1990) predict, and the
other is that unionized firms use stock option less frequently, which is different
from Gomez and Tzioumis (2006)’s finding that American labour unions do
not affect pay-performance sensitivities. Possible implications of the lack of
pay-performance sensitivity in unionized firms call for further scrutiny.
Fourth, the fact that the unionization rate does not have a significant
relation with stock option use implies that the organization of unions is
enough to bar the adoption of new methods of payment. This is in line with
Dial and Murphy (1995), suggesting that companies replace a controversial
bonus payment with conventional stock option payment in the United States
when they experience political pressures on pay. The adoption of stock
option is a controversial topic in Korea, and many unionized firms experience
resistance when they try to adopt executive stock options. The results replicate
this phenomenon.
Fifth, union effect on executive pay could appear stronger than in
the United States due to Korea’s unique culture reflected in employment
relations. Employment relations in Korea are characterized by the presence
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of paternalistic leadership through which employers take responsibility for
their employees under the concept of family (Kim and Bae 2004). Moreover,
the strong collectivism that prioritizes internal solidarity and collective goal
is commonly found in Korean organizations (Cho and Yoon 2001). Such
cultural characteristics might lead executives to react more sensitively to their
employees’ opinions and adjust their preferences more proactively.
5. Concluding remarks
This article explored whether stakeholders other than shareholders or
managers would influence executive compensation decisions, focusing on
employees. Employees were chosen as they have enough incentive to monitor
their firm’s financial soundness and organizational fairness. Based on the
assumption that employees’ voice and power is best exercised when it is
organized into a labour union, the relationship between union organization
and executive compensation was tested empirically.
The results showed that executives’ cash compensation is lower and the
stock options are less likely to be included in their compensation scheme
when employees are organized into a union. The findings of this article show
that employees influence executive compensation when they have systematic
monitoring and an organized voice. This suggests the policy implication
that employee representation on executive remuneration committees, recently
suggested by think tanks (Carley 2011; High Pay Commision 2011; PIRC
2013), may not be a strict regulatory requirement in countries with strong
firm-level labour unions.
Related topics could be discussed further following this article, such as
the question of whether this is beneficial or detrimental for shareholders.
Although additional monitoring of managerial misbehaviour could be
interpreted as positive, employees’ intentions or purposes are unclear and
possible spillover effects such as their impact on firm performance have
not been directly tested. Future research could be designed to see whether
labour unions damage incentives for executives. In addition, whether such a
reduction in cash compensation is applied to all executive directors or only to
a particular group of executives was not tested here, due to data limitations
on executive compensation, which provided only average cash compensation
per executive. For example, academics in Korea who request the disclosure of
individual executives’ compensation criticize that companies disguise unfair
executive pay through collective compensation reports (Ahn 2011). Examples
of this include executives who are relatives of an owner-manager being paid
extremely high compensation, or that a controlling shareholder-manager who
is not a member of board takes extreme payments without reporting. If a
controlling shareholder has considerable power in compensation decisions
and if there is indeed serious pay discrimination between owner family
members and hired executives, it is also possible that employees’ roles in
limiting executive pay may affect only hired executives. Such dimensions
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should be further studied when more detailed executive pay data become
available.
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Appendix A: Additional Tables
TABLE A1
Labour Union Presence and Cash Compensation
Ln(Executive Compensation)
(1) (2)
Union Presence (1 if exist) −0.344***
(0.087)
Union Presence at (t−1) −0.361***
(0.092)
Ln(Total Assets) 0.323*** 0.330***
(0.027) (0.030)
Ln(Employee Wage) 0.559*** 0.585***
(0.101) (0.113)
Tobin’s Q 0.225*** 0.218***
(0.062) (0.065)






Ownership Concentration (%) −0.008*** −0.008***
(0.002) (0.002)
Board Ownership (%) 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.003)





Controls, Year & Industry FE Y Y
Adjusted R2 0.614 0.607
Note: This table presents the regression results of executive compensation on union presence.
Dependent variable is log-transformed average executive cash compensation. Independent
variable of interest is union presence that is equal to 1 if the firm is unionized. Column (1) is
using current year’s union presence, while column (3) is using previous year’s union presence.
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TABLE A2
Labour Union Rate and Cash Compensation
Ln(Executive Compensation)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Union Rate: All Firms (%) −0.006*** −0.003**
(0.001) (0.001)
Union Rate at (t−1): All Firms (%) −0.006*** −0.003*
(0.001) (0.002)
Ln(Total Assets) 0.327*** 0.282*** 0.337*** 0.263***
(0.028) (0.043) (0.031) (0.050)
Ln(Employee Wage) 0.626*** 0.322*** 0.679*** 0.366***
(0.099) (0.072) (0.111) (0.084)
Tobin’s Q 0.230*** 0.182*** 0.191*** 0.166***
(0.059) (0.037) (0.064) (0.036)
Stock Return −0.019 −0.013 −0.022 −0.014
(0.013) (0.009) (0.014) (0.009)
ROA 0.941*** 0.850*** 0.952*** 0.832***
(0.250) (0.157) (0.334) (0.193)
Volatility −0.002 0.000 −0.002 0.000
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Ownership Concentration(%) −0.008*** 0.000 −0.007*** 0.004***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Board Ownership (%) 0.002 −0.002 0.002 −0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Board Size −0.026** 0.001 −0.025* 0.002
(0.013) (0.008) (0.013) (0.008)
Constant −0.461 4.875*** −1.707 4.643***
(1.647) (1.590) (1.845) (1.787)
Observations 1,310 1,310 1,103 1,103
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Industry FE Y N Y N
Company FE N Y N Y
Adjusted R2 0.617 0.866 0.607 0.887
Note: This table presents the regression results of executive compensation on unionization
rate. Dependent variable is log-transformed average executive cash compensation. Independent
variable of interest is unionization rate that is proportion of unionized employees. Columns (1)
and (2) are using current year’s unionization rate, while columns (3) and (4) are using previous
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TABLE A3
Labour Union Rate and Cash Compensation: Unionized Firms Only
Ln(Executive Compensation)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Union Rate: Unionized Firms (%) −0.004** −0.003*
(0.002) (0.002)
Union Rate at (t−1): Unionized Firms (%) −0.003* −0.003*
(0.002) (0.002)
Ln(Total Assets) 0.284*** 0.311*** 0.296*** 0.340***
(0.026) (0.050) (0.029) (0.056)
Ln(Employee Wage) 0.549*** 0.190* 0.608*** 0.292***
(0.111) (0.099) (0.127) (0.105)
Tobin’s Q 0.249*** 0.200*** 0.184** 0.162***
(0.061) (0.045) (0.073) (0.041)
ROA 0.691*** 0.706*** 0.727** 0.599***
(0.236) (0.179) (0.323) (0.223)
Volatility −0.002 −0.001 −0.002 −0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Ownership Concentration (%) −0.004* 0.002 −0.003 0.006***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Board Ownership (%) 0.006** −0.002 0.007** −0.003
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Board Size −0.030** −0.002 −0.027* −0.004
(0.013) (0.008) (0.014) (0.009)
Constant 1.765 6.221*** 0.328 3.932*
(1.797) (2.069) (2.049) (2.195)
Observations 1,000 1,000 847 847
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Industry FE Y N Y N
Company FE N Y N Y
Adjusted R2 0.572 0.836 0.557 0.860
Note: This table replicates the analysis in Table A2 using unionized firm sample only. Standard
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TABLE A4
Quantile Regression: Level of Executive Compensation and Union Presence
Ln(Executive Compensation)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Q(0.05) Q(0.25) Q(0.5) Q(0.75) Q(0.95)
Union Presence (1 if exist) −0.0582 −0.119* −0.164** −0.527*** −0.962***
(−0.97) (−2.13) (−2.75) (−6.70) (−5.58)
Ln(Total Assets) 0.124*** 0.190*** 0.294*** 0.478*** 0.527***
(5.08) (9.76) (14.46) (17.63) (7.95)
Ln(Employee Wage) 0.310** 0.567*** 0.616*** 0.671*** 0.204
(2.61) (5.55) (6.13) (5.95) (1.04)
Tobin’s Q 0.0235 0.166** 0.282*** 0.291*** 0.126
(0.55) (2.90) (4.45) (3.61) (1.14)
Stock Return −0.0135 0.00691 0.0103 −0.0498* −0.0301
(−0.35) (0.33) (0.39) (−2.46) (−1.09)
ROA 1.839** 0.919** 0.640* 1.049** 1.595**
(3.16) (2.86) (2.08) (2.67) (2.63)
Volatility −0.00606** −0.00322 −0.000288 0.00360 0.000335
(−2.59) (−1.73) (−0.16) (1.66) (0.10)
Ownership Concentration (%) 0.00138 −0.00382* −0.00853*** −0.0140*** −0.0101*
(0.80) (−2.35) (−4.94) (−6.32) (−2.58)
Board Ownership (%) 0.00407 0.00116 0.000213 −0.0000940 −0.00262
(1.58) (0.52) (0.09) (−0.03) (−0.76)
Board Size −0.0402** −0.00923 −0.0223* −0.0497*** 0.00122
(−3.20) (−0.94) (−2.05) (−3.62) (0.05)
Constant 9.365*** 2.194 −0.440 −4.774** 3.603
(4.77) (1.33) (−0.29) (−2.76) (1.09)
Observations 1,321 1,321 1,321 1,321 1,321
Year & Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y
Adjusted R2 0.145 0.308 0.375 0.397 0.181
Note:This table presents unconditional quantile regression results of union presence on executive
compensation. Dependent variable is log-transformed average executive cash compensation
and independent variable of interest is a binary variable that indicates union presence. Each
column measures the effect of union presence on executive compensation in the corresponding
quantile group. For example, column (1) presents the effect of union presence on executive





C© 2020 The Authors. British Journal of Industrial Relations published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
30 British Journal of Industrial Relations
TABLE A5
Quantile Regression: Level of Executive Compensation and Union Rate
Ln(Executive Compensation)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Q(0.05) Q(0.25) Q(0.5) Q(0.75) Q(0.95)
Union Rate (%) 0.0000508 −0.00394*** −0.00398*** −0.00809*** −0.00881***
(0.05) (−4.30) (−4.35) (−6.63) (−3.50)
Ln(Total Assets) 0.119*** 0.191*** 0.300*** 0.482*** 0.529***
(4.66) (9.85) (14.79) (17.54) (7.75)
Ln(Employee Wage) 0.348** 0.627*** 0.663*** 0.756*** 0.301
(2.83) (6.30) (6.62) (6.55) (1.49)
Tobin’s Q 0.0302 0.169*** 0.301*** 0.308*** 0.152
(0.63) (3.49) (5.15) (3.73) (1.24)
Stock Return −0.0175 0.00355 0.0101 −0.0510* −0.0490
(−0.44) (0.17) (0.37) (−2.48) (−1.82)
ROA 1.889** 0.713* 0.523 0.740 1.351*
(3.13) (2.27) (1.69) (1.88) (2.22)
Volatility −0.00673** −0.00289 −0.000316 0.00283 −0.00259
(−2.71) (−1.59) (−0.17) (1.30) (−0.75)
Ownership Concentration (%) 0.000467 −0.00331* −0.00844*** −0.0128*** −0.00965*
(0.25) (−2.01) (−4.78) (−5.68) (−2.43)
Board Ownership (%) 0.00332 0.00138 0.00107 0.00106 −0.000357
(1.19) (0.62) (0.47) (0.39) (−0.11)
Board Size −0.0417** −0.00846 −0.0270* −0.0562*** −0.0225
(−3.25) (−0.88) (−2.50) (−4.19) (−0.84)
Constant 8.916*** 2.168 −1.904 −6.915*** 1.256
(4.31) (1.34) (−1.24) (−3.90) (0.36)
Observations 1,310 1,310 1,310 1,310 1,310
Year & Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y
Adjusted R2 0.145 0.319 0.383 0.397 0.160
Note:This table presents unconditional quantile regression results of union presence on executive
compensation. Dependent variable is log-transformed average executive cash compensation and
independent variable of interest is a binary variable that indicates union presence. Each column
measures the effect of union presence on executive compensation in the corresponding quantile
group. For example, column (1) presents the effect of union presence on executive compensation
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TABLE A6
Quantile Regression: Level of Employee Wage and Union Rate
Ln(Employee Wage)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Q(0.05) Q(0.25) Q(0.5) Q(0.75) Q(0.95)
Union Rate: All Firms (%) 0.00161 0.000955* 0.00177*** 0.000467 0.000248
(1.66) (2.10) (4.43) (1.35) (0.58)
Ln(Total Assets) 0.0331* 0.0809*** 0.104*** 0.0762*** 0.0485***
(1.96) (9.11) (12.22) (9.18) (4.03)
Tobin’s Q 0.0151 0.0269 0.0629* 0.0346 0.0368
(0.28) (1.00) (2.50) (1.61) (1.43)
Stock Return −0.0172 −0.0122 −0.0110 −0.00532 −0.00382
(−0.56) (−1.03) (−1.38) (−0.81) (−0.61)
ROA 0.361 0.317 0.682*** 0.360** 0.389**
(0.70) (1.91) (4.76) (3.12) (3.02)
Volatility −0.00194 −0.000805 −0.000442 −0.000697 0.00186*
(−0.75) (−0.84) (−0.55) (−1.07) (1.97)
Ownership Concentration (%) −0.000214 0.000769 0.000952 0.00134* −0.00108
(−0.14) (0.96) (1.24) (1.99) (−1.55)
Board Ownership (%) −0.00925*** −0.00280** −0.00357*** −0.00458*** −0.00230**
(−3.69) (−2.67) (−3.59) (−5.40) (−2.94)
Board Size −0.00758 −0.00582 −0.00507 0.000393 0.00192
(−0.76) (−1.19) (−1.16) (0.10) (0.36)
Constant 15.22*** 14.53*** 13.92*** 15.17*** 16.14***
(21.79) (51.13) (45.92) (58.30) (47.52)
Observations 1,310 1,310 1,310 1,310 1,310
Year & Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y
Adjusted R2 0.118 0.280 0.362 0.292 0.120
Note: This table presents unconditional quantile regression results of union rate on employee
wage. Dependent variable is log-transformed average employee wage and independent variable of
interest is unionization rate. Each column measures the effect of union rate on employee wage in
the corresponding quantile group. For example, column (1) presents the effect of union presence
on executive compensation that is in the lowest 5 percentile in its distribution. Standard errors




C© 2020 The Authors. British Journal of Industrial Relations published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
32 British Journal of Industrial Relations
TABLE A7
Union Presence and Stock Option Use
Stock option use
(1) (2)
Union Presence (1 if exist) −0.291***
(0.068)
Union Presence at (t−1) −0.304***
(0.072)
Ln(Total Assets) 0.068*** 0.071***
(0.021) (0.023)
Ln(Employee Wage) −0.011 −0.028
(0.092) (0.111)
Tobin’s Q 0.127** 0.157***
(0.049) (0.054)






Ownership Concentration (%) −0.001 −0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
Board Ownership (%) −0.003 −0.003
(0.002) (0.002)





Controls, Year & Industry FE Y Y
Adjusted R2 0.197 0.217
Note: This table presents the regression results of stock option use in executive compensation on
union presence. Dependent variable is a binary variable that is equal to 1 if the firm uses stock
option to pay executives, and 0 otherwise. Independent variable of interest is union presence that
is equal to 1 if the firm is unionized. Column (1) is using current year’s union presence, while
column.
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TABLE A8
Union Rate and Stock Option Use
Stock option use
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Union Rate: All Firms (%) −0.004*** −0.000
(0.001) (0.002)
Union Rate at (t−1): All Firms (%) −0.004*** 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Ln(Total Assets) 0.069*** 0.012 0.075*** 0.061
(0.022) (0.042) (0.024) (0.048)
Ln(Employee Wage) 0.030 0.048 0.036 −0.001
(0.093) (0.067) (0.108) (0.063)
Tobin’s Q 0.136*** 0.022 0.147*** 0.017
(0.052) (0.031) (0.055) (0.019)
Stock Return 0.003 0.005* 0.005 −0.001
(0.010) (0.003) (0.010) (0.003)
ROA −0.295 0.165 −0.447* 0.064
(0.214) (0.125) (0.261) (0.120)
Volatility 0.001 −0.000 0.002 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Ownership Concentration (%) −0.001 0.001 −0.000 0.002
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Board Ownership (%) −0.003 −0.001 −0.003 −0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Board Size −0.008 0.003 −0.014 0.005
(0.010) (0.005) (0.010) (0.004)
Constant −2.423 −1.070 −2.652 −1.653
(1.497) (1.775) (1.692) (1.770)
Observations 1,310 1,310 1,103 1,103
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Industry FE Y N Y N
Company FE N Y N Y
Adjusted R2 0.174 0.879 0.186 0.923
Note: This table presents the regression results of stock option use in executive compensation on
unionization rate. Dependent variable is a binary variable that is equal to 1 if the firm uses stock
option to pay executives, and 0 otherwise. Independent variable of interest is unionization rate that
is proportion of unionized employees. Columns (1) and (2) are using current year’s unionization
rate, while columns (3) and (4) are using previous year’s unionization rate. Standard errors are




C© 2020 The Authors. British Journal of Industrial Relations published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
34 British Journal of Industrial Relations
TABLE A9
Union Rate and Stock Option Use: Unionized Firms Only
Stock option use
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Union Rate: Unionized Firms (%) −0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.003)
Union Rate at (t−1): Unionized Firms (%) −0.001 0.003**
(0.001) (0.001)
Ln(Total Assets) 0.070*** 0.044 0.077*** 0.080
(0.023) (0.049) (0.024) (0.062)
Ln(Employee Wage) −0.082 0.098 −0.078 −0.000
(0.091) (0.107) (0.097) (0.098)
Tobin’s Q 0.109* 0.040 0.113* 0.017
(0.063) (0.035) (0.058) (0.024)
Stock Return 0.011 0.002 0.013 −0.001
(0.009) (0.003) (0.009) (0.003)
ROA −0.132 0.127 −0.228 −0.032
(0.215) (0.132) (0.261) (0.110)
Volatility 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Ownership Concentration (%) 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Board Ownership (%) −0.003 −0.004* −0.004 −0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Board Size −0.007 0.006 −0.013 0.007
(0.011) (0.005) (0.011) (0.004)
Constant −0.613 −2.954 −0.886 −2.219
(1.602) (2.275) (1.694) (2.534)
Observations 1,000 1,000 847 847
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Industry FE Y N Y N
Company FE N Y N Y
Adjusted R2 0.167 0.863 0.175 0.909
Note: This table replicates the analysis in A7 using only unionized firm sample. Standard errors
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TABLE A10
Union Rate and Stock Option Use: Mitigating Effect of Chaebol Membership
Ln(Executive
Compensation) Stock option use
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Union Presence ×Chaebol −0.368** −0.246*
(0.160) (0.132)
Union Rate × Chaebol −0.011*** −0.005*
(0.004) (0.003)
Union Rate: All Firms (%) 0.002 0.002
(0.003) (0.002)
Union Presence (1 if exist) −0.187** −0.138
(0.094) (0.091)
Chaebol (1 if Chaebol) 0.403** 0.281**
(0.160) (0.130)
Ln(Total Assets) 0.306*** 0.276*** 0.057** 0.015
(0.033) (0.076) (0.027) (0.037)
Ln(Employee Wage) 0.553*** 0.307** −0.013 0.049
(0.104) (0.135) (0.094) (0.066)
Tobin’s Q 0.192*** 0.167*** 0.128*** 0.017
(0.059) (0.053) (0.049) (0.031)
Stock Return −0.017 −0.011 0.005 0.005*
(0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.003)
ROA 1.055*** 0.977*** −0.217 0.165
(0.270) (0.210) (0.226) (0.137)
Volatility −0.001 0.000 0.001 −0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Ownership Concentration (%) −0.008*** −0.000 −0.000 0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
Board Ownership (%) 0.004 −0.001 −0.002 −0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Board Size −0.020 0.000 −0.003 0.004
(0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.005)
Constant 1.128 5.371* −1.479 −1.144
(1.750) (3.036) (1.483) (1.657)
Observations 1,282 1,271 1,282 1,271
Adjusted R2 0.631 0.868 0.211 0.880
Controls & Year FE Y Y Y Y
Industry FE Y N Y N
Company FE N Y N Y
Note: This table presents the mitigating effects of a firm’s Chaebol membership over union’s
influence on executive compensation. Dependent variable is either log-transformed average
executive compensation or a binary indicator whether the firm uses stock option. Independent
variable of interest is union variables (union presence or unionization rate) interacted with
Chaebol membership that is equal to 1 if a firm belongs to a Chaebol group. Standard errors
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TABLE A11
Union Rate and Stock Option Use: Mitigating Effect of Financial Risk
Ln(Executive
Compensation) Stock option use
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Union Presence × Financial Risk −0.329** −0.029
(0.152) (0.121)
Union Rate × Financial Risk −0.003 −0.001**
(0.002) (0.001)
Union Presence (1 if exist) −0.178* −0.274***
(0.098) (0.086)
Union Rate −0.002 0.001
(0.003) (0.002)
Financial Risk 0.087 0.054 −0.029 0.049*
(0.138) (0.071) (0.113) (0.026)
Ln(Total Assets) 0.359*** 0.267*** 0.078*** 0.020
(0.038) (0.081) (0.027) (0.041)
Ln(Employee Wage) 0.540*** 0.256* 0.026 0.100
(0.110) (0.143) (0.102) (0.081)
Tobin’s Q 0.204*** 0.194*** 0.145*** 0.021
(0.061) (0.055) (0.049) (0.032)
Stock Return −0.014 −0.008 0.007 0.004
(0.012) (0.011) (0.009) (0.003)
ROA 0.955*** 0.764*** −0.195 0.159
(0.244) (0.197) (0.214) (0.132)
Volatility −0.001 −0.001 0.002 −0.000
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Ownership Concentration (%) −0.008*** 0.000 −0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
Board Ownership (%) 0.002 −0.001 −0.002 −0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Board Size −0.017 0.003 −0.004 0.003
(0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.005)
Constant 0.109 6.482* −2.605 −2.204
(1.882) (3.328) (1.624) (1.871)
Observations 1,203 1,192 1,203 1,192
Adjusted R2 0.615 0.867 0.183 0.879
Controls & Year FE Y Y Y Y
Industry FE Y N Y N
Company FE N Y N Y
Note: This table presents the mitigating effects of a firm’s financial risk over union’s influence
on executive compensation. Dependent variable is either log-transformed average executive
compensation or a binary indicator whether the firm uses stock option. Independent variable
of interest is union variables (union presence or unionization rate) interacted with financial risk
that is equal to 1 if a firm’s cash-flow volatility is above median in a given year. Standard errors
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TABLE A12
Union Rate and Stock Option Use: Mitigating Effect of Employee Wage
Ln(Executive
Compensation) Stock option use
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Union Presence × High Employee Wage −0.281** −0.114
(0.119) (0.102)
Union Rate × High Employee Wage 0.002 −0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Union Presence (1 if exist) −0.195** −0.229**
(0.088) (0.089)
Union Rate −0.004 −0.000
(0.003) (0.002)
High Employee Wage 0.393*** −0.047 0.116 −0.005
(0.109) (0.063) (0.098) (0.030)
Ln(Total Assets) 0.318*** 0.288*** 0.067*** 0.011
(0.026) (0.078) (0.022) (0.042)
Ln(Employee Wage) 0.342*** 0.322** −0.048 0.058
(0.112) (0.147) (0.091) (0.075)
Tobin’s Q 0.220*** 0.193*** 0.127*** 0.021
(0.061) (0.055) (0.048) (0.031)
Stock Return −0.018 −0.012 0.006 0.005
(0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.003)
ROA 1.076*** 0.826*** −0.200 0.170
(0.242) (0.208) (0.209) (0.124)
Volatility −0.002 0.000 0.002 −0.000
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Ownership Concentration (%) −0.008*** 0.000 −0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
Board Ownership (%) 0.001 −0.002 −0.003 −0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Board Size −0.021* −0.000 −0.003 0.003
(0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.005)
Constant 4.492** 4.731 −1.032 −1.219
(1.829) (3.183) (1.518) (1.900)
Observations 1,321 1,310 1,321 1,310
Adjusted R2 0.622 0.867 0.199 0.879
Controls & Year FE Y Y Y Y
Industry FE Y N Y N
Company FE N Y N Y
Note: This table presents the mitigating effects of employee wage over union’s influence
on executive compensation. Dependent variable is either log-transformed average executive
compensation or a binary indicator whether the firm uses stock option. Independent variable
of interest is union variables (union presence or unionization rate) interacted with high employee
wage that is equal to 1 if a firm’s employee wage is above industrymedian in a given year. Standard
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TABLE A13
Union Rate and Stock Option Use: Mitigating Effect of Labour Intensity
Ln(Executive
Compensation) Stock option use
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Union Presence × Labour Intensity −0.094 −0.068
(0.071) (0.056)
Union Rate × Labour Intensity −0.002 −0.002**
(0.001) (0.001)
Union Presence (1 if exist) −0.311*** −0.280***
(0.088) (0.073)
Union Rate −0.005*** −0.003**
(0.001) (0.001)
Labour Intensity −0.000 −0.000 −0.000** −0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln(Total Assets) 0.328*** 0.330*** 0.074*** 0.076***
(0.028) (0.029) (0.022) (0.022)
Ln(Employee Wage) 0.610*** 0.660*** 0.043 0.096
(0.106) (0.102) (0.094) (0.093)
Tobin’s Q 0.211*** 0.221*** 0.117** 0.121**
(0.061) (0.059) (0.049) (0.052)
Stock Return −0.017 −0.020 0.005 0.001
(0.012) (0.012) (0.009) (0.010)
ROA 1.144*** 0.979*** −0.141 −0.228
(0.255) (0.254) (0.208) (0.217)
Volatility −0.001 −0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Ownership Concentration (%) −0.008*** −0.007*** −0.001 −0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Board Ownership (%) 0.001 0.002 −0.003 −0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Board Size −0.021* −0.025** −0.004 −0.008
(0.013) (0.012) (0.010) (0.009)
Constant −0.177 −1.133 −2.716* −3.734**
(1.806) (1.744) (1.510) (1.502)
Observations 1,321 1,310 1,321 1,310
Adjusted R2 0.615 0.618 0.212 0.193
Controls & Year FE Y Y Y Y
Industry FE Y N Y N
Company FE N Y N Y
Note: This table presents the mitigating effects of employee wage over union’s influence
on executive compensation. Dependent variable is either log-transformed average executive
compensation or a binary indicator whether the firm uses stock option. Independent variable of
interest is union variables (union presence or unionization rate) interacted with labour intensity
that is equal to 1 if a firm has below median production per labour. Production per labour is net
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